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ABSTRACT
The United States, while enjoying the highest level of prosperity
in its history, is, at the same time, faced with the possible loss of
its monetary gold reserves due to a chronic deficit in its International
Balance of Payments. Actions have been taken to eliminate the deficit
in the balance of payments. These, however, if successful, offer only
a short term solution to the problem. What is required is a solution
which will not only assist the United States in eliminating the deficit,
but will also prevent the annual recurrence of balance of payments cri-
ses. This paper discusses the Balance of Payments problem, its back-
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With the late summer of 1945, the free world rejoiced at the suc-
cessful conclusion of World War II. As must happen in the wake of any
catastrophe, rejoicing soon gave way to the grim task of reconstruction.
If the free world were to continue to exist, it must rebuild. But where
to turn for the wherewithal to carry out the massive reconstruction?
The United States, untouched by bombings, a veteran of only four years
of war as compared to her allies' six years, a United States suddenly
affluent with the wealth accumulated from the years as the sole economi-
cally productive country of the world, was the natural choice. The Uni-
ted States accepted the task and, with it, the leadership of the free
world.
Today, however, the United States finds her position as economic
leader of the world threatened. There exists a "gold problem." What is
this "gold problem" which, suddenly, threatens our economic well-being?
How could the United States possibly be in economic difficulty with the
greatest gross national product in the world, and every indication of
even larger gross national products in the future? Further, why has the
United States world economic position so drastically changed in the past
ten years? It is the purpose of this paper to examine the problem and




Today, gold is one measure of a nation's economic well-being. Its
movement into and out of a nation is the temperature by which the eco-
nomic physician can measure the patient's economic health. Although the
basic function of money as a medium of exchange has remained unchanged,
the forms of money have evolved over the ages from commodity money to
representative coinage, from coins to paper currency , and from paper cur-
rency to deposits. Whatever its form;, money is and has been the life-
blood of trade. Before the trade can be completed, an agreement must be
reached by the participants on the value of the money involved. A stand-
ard must be agreed upon. Prior to the nineteenth century 9 trade was car-
ried out in the money of the major trading power, hence no additional
standard was required. This system was so popular that it was not until
the nineteenth century that the majority of the nations of the world
began coinage of national currencies. The birth of national currencies
demanded that, if trade was to continue smoothly, some standard for equat-
ing national currencies must be agreed upon. Gold and silver, in them-
selves long popular as money, became the standards, with gold the most
popular. The gold standard was born. The use of gold or the gold stand-
ard is then a fairly recent development, beginning as it did with the
appearance of individual national currencies. Table I is a chronology
of gold standard adoption by the major countries of the world.
1Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, The Search for Certainty in
an Uncertain World (San Francisco; 1962), p. 12.
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Source: Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, The Search for
Certainty in an Uncertain World (San Francisco: 1962),
p. 10.

Under the international gold standard, each country legally de-
fines its monetary unit in terms of a given gold content. Secondly,
the monetary authorities freely buy and sell gold at the official price
set. Finally, a par or mint rate of exchange between any two gold
standard currencies, equal to the ratio of their gold contents or the
2
ratio of the prices of gold in each currency, is established.
Under this standard, a country paid for its international purchases
with an outflow of gold and received in payment for its sales an inflow
of gold. Ideally, the outflows are matched by inflows, but seldom does
the ideal occur. When an outflow exceeds an inflow, this deficit is
financed with the sale of gold reserves. Under what has been called
the "classical" gold standard, automatic adjustments would take place
to prevent the ultimate loss of all of any country's gold reserves. With
the outflow of gold, the domestic money supply would shrink. As the
money supply shrinks, prices should fall due to the same amount of busi-
ness being transacted with less money. The decline in domestic prices
relative to foreign prices should make importing less attractive, while
making domestic goods more attractive to foreign markets. Following the
price decline in the deficit country, there should occur a similar cost
decline since wages should fall, thus further improving the competitive
position for the deficit country.
In addition, with the foreign purchase the buyer's deposits fall,
causing an equivalent loss in bank reserves. With the fractional reserve
system, the loss causes a reduction of deposits by a multiple of the
2
Delbert A. Snider, Introduction to International Economics (Home-
wood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1963), p. 188.

loss. This will be accomplished by a reduction in bank loans and invest-
ments. Security prices will fall due to bank sales and interest rates
will rise with money more scarce. This will tend to reduce the level
of production and employment which will tend to further force down
prices of finished goods and labor. This will further serve to improve
the deficit country's trade position and tend to restore a balance be-
tween inflow and outflow of gold.
It is expected that a similar but opposite reaction to the defla-
tionary trend in the deficit country is taking place in the surplus
country. Inflationary actions of prices, costs and banks should serve
3
to reduce the inflow of gold and to bring flows into balance. Thus,
the gold standard offered and appeared to provide an "automatic" system
for maintaining a balance between a nation's expenditures and receipts.
From 1879 to 1914, the world enjoyed prosperity, a prosperity attri-
buted by many to an adherence to a gold standard. However, in actuality,
banks did not completely play the game by the rules. While the majority
of the central banks did raise interest rates when faced with gold out-
flow, they proved to be loath to lower them at the onset of inflow.
Further, due to the long run expansion taking place, gold losses and
high interest rates did not have as great a depressive effect on world
economy as theorized. The success of the gold standard during the lat-
ter part of the nineteenth century and the early twentieth century can
be attributed in great part to the fact that Great Britain and the pound
sterling provided the economic and financial strength around which the
system revolved, and that the rate of change in prices, income and
Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, op_. cit . , p. 15.

business activity in the various countries was quite closely synchro-
nized.
World War I demonstrated the critical inadequacy of the gold stand-
ard and was the beginning of its abandonment as the prevailing standard
in international trade, a process which took about twenty- two years. In
time of war, it is obvious that the productive resources of the bellig-
erents will be channeled, for the most part, into war productions. Ex-
ports drop to almost zero while imports rise equivalently. If a nation
were to adhere to the gold standard under these conditions, her reserves
would be exhausted in a short period of time. The United States was the
only major belligerent to remain on anything approaching a gold standard
during the war.
By 1920, most nations had returned to the gold standard or to an
approximation of it. This was the gold exchange standard by which coun-
tries held as their reserves currencies of countries on the gold standard.
This encouraged the accumulation of short term funds in depository coun-
tries. Great Britain, with a high interest rate, received most of this
flow. The short term funds, easily redeemable, posed a danger to the
depositing country which was realized with the crash of 1929. The sudden
movement of short term funds, occasioned by the panic, forced Great Brit-
ain off the gold standard in 1931.
In contrast to the British, the United States departure from the
gold standard was brought about by domestic causes. The Great Depression
Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, op_. cit., p. 18,
Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, op_. cit . , p. 25,

brought to the United States falling prices, reduced income and a vir-
tual collapse of the banking system. The solution to these domestic
problems was thought to be the devaluation of the dollar. Accordingly,
in 1934, after several months of daily price adjustments, the price of
gold was fixed at $35.00 per ounce as compared to the previous price of
$20.67 per ounce. Exports of gold were suspended and individuals were
forbidden to hold gold.
The departure of the United States from the gold standard left a
group consisting of France, the Netherlands, Italy, Belgium, Switzerland
and Poland adhering to the gold standard. This "gold bloc," however,
suffered a rapid demise in 1936 when France, Switzerland and the Nether-
lands devalued their currencies.
The last international effort, prior to World War II, to achieve
stability in international trade through cooperation in currency control
was the Tripartite Agreement, signed by Great Britain, France and the
United States in 1936. Under the provisions of the agreement, the signa-
tories pledged avoidance of exchange rate fluctuations and competitive
exchange depreciation. The agreement was further strengthened by the
subsequent joining of the Netherlands, Belgium, and Switzerland. The
agreement operated effectively, achieving stability of exchange rates
until the outbreak of the Second World War, at which time it ceased to
be operative. The outbreak of World War II signaled the end of one
era and the beginning of another. It marked the emergence of the United
States as a world leader, both economically and militarily. It also
marked the beginning of the problems we face today, the balance of pay-
ments deficit and the gold outflow.




Whenever a consumer spends more than he earns, he must somehow meet
the difference between his expenses and his wages. He will usually do
this by drawing on his savings or by borrowing. If his reputation is
good, his creditors will accept his note. The government in its domes-
tic financial operations is similar to the consumer. It matches its
expenditures with taxes, and when a deficit exists, it offers a promise
to pay and we, the taxpayers, accept these promises, and they become
the National Debt.
In the field of international trade, a similar comparison exists
between the consumer and the nation. The nation spends money abroad in
the form of purchases (imports), loans or grants and receives money in
payment for exports and profits from investments. When spending exceeds
receipts a deficit exists. It is financed with outright payments from
the nation's gold reserves or with promissory notes. These promissory
notes are the dollars which foreign governments hold in bank balances
rather than trading for gold. When a nation's expenditures balance
against its receipts, it is said to have its international payments in
balance. When expenditures outweigh receipts, it is said to have an in-
ternational balance of payments deficit. When the converse is true, a
nation is said to have an international balance of payments surplus.
The International Balance of Payments is an accounting statement
which gives a picture of the overall transactions of any country in the
international economy over a specific period of time. It is a summary
of the money value of all exchanges and transfers of goods and services
8

and evidences of debt or ownership between residents, businesses and
government and other institutions of one country and the rest of the
world for a given period of time. As an accounting statement it is a
listing of debits and credits of nations. Debits give rise to claims
for payment against a resident, business or government of the country
by someone outside the country, and credits result in claims for payment
by domestic residents or institutions against foreign interests. Figure
1 is a sample of the United States' Balance of Payments account. As
an accounting statement, debits and credits must balance. When debits
exceed credits, the balance is obtained by a change in the monetary re-
serve assets which are represented by gold, or changes in the position
of the United States in the International Monetary Fund. However, the
changes in gold reserves or in the International Monetary Fund position
do not generally represent the complete adjustment factor between debits
and credits. Foreign banks, individuals and governments usually hold a
large amount of dollars in the form of bank accounts, rather than cash-
ing them in for gold. These dollar holdings will be found as a credit
entry in the short term component of the capital account. The algebraic
sum of gold movements and short term capital give the numerical picture
of the balance of payments deficit or surplus. They indicate the method
of financing the deficit or surplus. Table II is a representation of
the status of the United States' balance of payments from 1947 to 1963.
At the end of World War II, the United States stood as the only
relatively stable country in the world. Western Europe, marked by the





MODEL BALANCE OF PAYMENTS
I. Current account: Debit Credit
A. Merchandise trade:
1. Merchandise imports x
2. Merchandise exports x
B. Service transactions:
1. Transportation:
a) Rendered by foreign vessels, airlines, etc. ... x
b) Rendered by domestic vessels, airlines, etc. .. x
2. Travel expenditures:
a) In foreign countries x
b) By foreigners in home country x
3. Interest and dividends:
a) Paid to foreigners x
b) Received from abroad x
4. Banking and insurance services:
a) Rendered by foreign institutions x
b) Rendered to foreigners by domestic institutions x
5. Government expenditures:
a) By home government abroad x
b) By foreign government in home country x
II. Capital account:
A. Long-term:
1. Purchase of securities from foreigners* x
2. Sale of securities to foreigners* x
B. Short-term:**
1. Increase of bank and brokerage balances abroad .... x
2. Decrease of foreign-held bank and brokerage balances
in home coun try x
3. Increase of foreign-held bank and brokerage bal-
ances in home country x
4. Decrease of bank and brokerage balances abroad .... x
III. Unilateral transfers:
A. Private:
1. Personal and institutional remittances to non-
residents x
2. Remittances received from abroad x
B. Governmental:
1. Grants, indemnities, and reparations made to other
countries x
2. Grants, indemnities, and reparations received from
other countries x
IV. Gold account:
A. Import of gold and increase of earmarked gold abroad*** x
B. Export of gold and increase of earmarked gold for for-
eign account*** x
*Includes new issues, transactions in outstanding issues, and trans-
fers resulting from redemption and sinking-fund operations.
**Also includes currency holdings, acceptances, and other short-term
claims not listed.
***
"Earmarked" gold is gold physically held in one country for the account
of another.







u. S. BALANCE OF PAYMENTS
Goods and Private Private Gov't Misc. Total
Services Remit- Long Range Capital Total Balance






1947 11,529 -669 - 896 -6,167 770 4,567
1948 6,440 -683 - 962 -4,852 1,062 1,005
1949 6,149 -521 - 621 -5,758 926 175
1950 1,779 -444 -1,048 -3,719 148 -3,580
1951 3,671 -386 - 740 -3,262 412 - 305
1952 2,226 -417 - 900 -2,508 553 -1,046
1953 386 -476 - 322 -2,196 456 -2,152
1954 1,828 -486 - 713 -1,683 - 496 -1,550
1955 2,009 -444 - 674 -2,352 316 -1,145
1956 3,967 -530 -1,961 -2,497 86 - 935
1957 5,729 -543 -2,902 -2,733 969 520
1958 2,206 -540 -2,552 -2,769 126 -3,529
1959 134 -575 -1,589 -2,637 924 -3,743
1960 3,769 -458 -2,114 -3,031 -2,047 -3 S 83L
1961 5,444 -470 -2,143 -3,685 -1,516 -2,370
1962 4,826 -491 -2,495 -3,909 - 117 -2,186
1963 5,485 -143 -3,053 -4,147 - 307 -2,165
Excludes goods and services transferred under military grants.




facilities destroyed, turned to the United States for aid. The United
States' response can be judged by a study of the period 1947 through
1949. Although the United States enjoyed a substantial net difference
of exports over imports, it is not matched by the annual surpluses for
these years. A substantial part of the dollars required to support
Europe's imports during these years was obtained in the form of loans
and grants from the United States. This was mandatory if the dollar
short countries of the world were to obtain the imports so badly needed
for recovery. At the same time, it served to raise the dollar to a
position of prominence among currencies, and made it an acceptable re-
serve currency in most countries of the world.
Commencing with 1950, the picture begins to change. The United
States began to experience deficits rather than surpluses in her balance
of payments. Commencing with the inordinately large deficit of 1950
(Korean War), the deficits recur but remain relatively constant (even
becoming a surplus in 1957 - Suez) until the drastic rise in 1958 and
continue large up to the present. The total result of the balance of
payments from 1947 to 1964 has been a deficit which has been financed
primarily by reduction of United States gold reserves and increased
foreign dollar holding. Table III shows the methods of financing the
balance of payments deficits and surpluses from 1947 through 1963. The
net result has been a reduction of United States gold reserves from
$24.6 billion in 1949 to a level of about $15 billion by mid-February,
1965, and an increase in foreign short term holding to approximately
$17 billion.
The significance of this deficit is obvious, if it is financed by




TOTAL NET BALANCE OF PAYMENTS OF U. S. AND HOW IT WAS FINANCED
Total Increase or Liquid
Surplus decrease (-) in dollar
or
Deficit(-)
Monetary Reserves liability (-)
Gold I.M.F. Convert. to foreigners
Currencies
1947 4,567 2,162 153 1,252
1948 1,005 1,530 206 - 731
1949 175 164 102 91
1950 -3,580 -1,743 - 15 -1,822
1951 - 305 53 - 20 - 338
1952 -1,046 379 36 -1,461
1953 -2,152 -1,161 - 95 - 896
1954 -1,550 - 298 -182 -1,070
1955 -1,145 41 -141 - 963
1956 - 935 306 563 -1,804
1957 520 798 367 - 645
1958 -3,529 -2,275 - 17 -1,237
1959 -3,743 -1,075 40 -2,708
1960 -3,881 -1,702 -741 -1,438
1961 -2,370 - 857 135 116 -1,764
1962 -2,186 - 890 -626 - 17 - 653
1963 -2,165 - 461 - 30 113 -1,787




it can continue just as long as these foreign holders of the balances
are willing to let these holdings increase. If they decided to withdraw
these dollar balances, the drain on the gold stock would be even more
rapid. Therefore, the immediate threat to the United States is that of
a sudden world wide rush to convert dollars to gold. To guard against
this threat two alternatives are available. First, increase the gold
reserve of the United States. However, due to the relatively fixed
supply of gold in the world, this is a practical impossibility. Second,
by selected economic measures, restore faith in the dollar by indicating
to the world that the United States is not taking advantage of her posi-
tion as a reserve currency power to finance her own expansion by deficit
operations. To accomplish this, immediate reduction of the deficit is
mandatory.
It is doubtful that the immediate aim of the United States policy
should be to become a surplus country. Such an eventuality under the
present world system would cause the repatriation of the foreign dollar
balances and remove the liquidity upon which the expansion of inter-
national trade has been based since 1945. This would effectively set
the free world back in time twenty years.
Clearly then, the International Balance of Payments problem must be
treated in two phases. First, the Short Term solution, a way to elimi-
nate the deficit and restore confidence in the dollar. Second, the Long
Term solution, a change in the present system, or the inception of a
new system which could guarantee the liquidity required for expanding
world trade, a liquidity not based upon the currency of any one nation.




ACCEPTABLE SHORT TERM SOLUTIONS
In order to cure an ill, the cause must be discovered. This is
equally true in the case of balance of payments deficits. A deficit is
synonymous with disequilibrium, but the type of disequilibrium decides
the course of action to be taken. Classically, there are three types of
disequilibrium, Monetary, Cyclical and Structural, and each is treated
1
in a fashion peculiar to itself.
Monetary disequilibrium occurs when prices and costs in one country
are too high relative to costs and prices in competing countries. This
condition can be treated by deflation of prices, exchange depreciation,
or a combination of the two.
Cyclical disequilibrium is a deficit in current account caused by
depression in other countries. This condition caused as it is by fac-
tors outside of the deficit country can best be corrected by measures
taken by the depressed country, supported by concurrent efforts of the
deficit country to maintain income and price levels by fiscal measures.
An alternative corrective measure would be the granting of aids and
grants to the depressed country.
Structural disequilibrium is based on shifts in international de-
mand or supply of productive agents or goods and services. This sort
of disequilibrium can take two forms common in this generation with dif-
ferent corrective measures for each. In the first case, where the pro-





obliged to accept some short term deficit. The best solution in this
case is the one practice utilized after World War II, the granting of
long term loans and aid to the deficit nation. The second case is that
of persistent deficits caused by a technological lag on the part of the
deficit country. The solution to this problem is the reallocation of
effort or the improvement of existing effort protected by legislation
against the more efficient foreign producers.
It is rare when a deficit can be ascribed to any one type of dis-
equilibrium. More often than not, it is a combination of disequilibri-
ums which is at the base of the problem. The need, therefore, exists
for the application of selective measures chosen on the basis of the
nature of the particular type or types of disequilibrium present and
2
the implications of alternative corrections.
Although the individual causes of the U. S. deficit are virtually
inseparable from each other, two general causes can be identified. The
first is the industrial growth of Western Europe and Japan. The rapid
increase in production and the mastery of low cost methods of production
rapidly improved their positions in world markets, increased their ex-
ports to the United States and made them attractive to the investment
of United States capital. The second cause is the increase in United
States military expenditures abroad. Most of the increase in expendi-
tures was in West Germany, the recipient country with the strongest pro-
3
clivity for running a balance of payments surplus.
Before recommending methods of correcting the balance of payments
2Snider, op. cit.
, pp. 306-314.
Committee for Economic Development, The International Position of
the Dollar (New York: May, 1961), p. 43.
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deficit problem, it would be well to examine some of the major objectives
of United States policy. This would preclude the selection of corrective
measures which would be in conflict with these objectives. Some major
objectives of United States policy are:
1. To maintain and strengthen the defense of the free world.
2. To promote the economic development of the underdeveloped coun-
tries and to make it possible for them to choose paths of development
that do not leave them subject to external domination.
3. To maintain a strong and growing domestic economy.
4. To maintain and strengthen a multilateral world trade and pay-
ments system as free as possible of restrictions.
5. To see the remainder of the free world maintain strong and pros-
4
perous economies and where appropriate to assist in this task.
Keeping in mind the national foreign policy, the following steps
can be taken by the United States to balance the payments and remove the
deficit. These measures can be divided into two broad categories:
1. Measures to be taken by the United States independently.
a) Maintain internal price stability, while not guaranteeing
an improvement of the international position, it will pre-
vent it from deteriorating.
b) Increase productivity, especially in industries in competi-
tion with foreigners.
c) Selective reduction of prices as a result of increased pro-
ductivity. In conjunction with increase in productivity,
this should provide an increase in exports.
Committee for Economic Development, op_. cit . , p. 48.
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d) Reduction of overseas investment and travel. Keeping in
mind the United States' advocacy of freely flowing capital
and the rights of citizens to travel, this step must be of
an admonitory nature except as a last resort.
e) Promotion of exports.
f) Reduction of military expenditures abroad.
g) Conditioning of nonmilitary loans and grants upon procure-
ment from United States' sources.
2. Measures to be taken in cooperation with other nations or by
other nations unilaterally.
a) Redistribution of defense burden in NATO.
b) Increase of aid by surplus nations to developing countries.
c) Reduction of trade and import restrictions.
d) Appreciation of foreign currencies.
While the foregoing measures will tend to bring the international
payments of the United States into balance, they will not guarantee an
improvement of the United States' liquidity position. Since confidence
in the liquidity of the United States is essential to prevent a sudden
drain on already limited gold reserves, any improvement of United States'
capability to meet drains will automatically lessen the possibility of
such drains. The following measures will serve to improve the liquidity
position:
Interest Rate Policy : An increased interest rate will tend to
limit the flow of short term funds to the higher interest countries of
the world. The risk of impeding the growth of the domestic economy by
Committee for Economic Development, op_. cit. , pp. 50-61,
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this step must be recognized. Therefore, the use of this measure may
be better reserved for later emergency use.
Gold Backing Policy ; Although gold is not a part of the domestic
money supply, Federal Reserve Banks are required to maintain gold holding
equal to 25 per cent of total note and deposit liabilities which now
amounts to $12 billion. Removal of this requirement would increase li-
quidity and strengthen the position in a painless fashion and hence, is
the best first step to be taken.*
Prepayment of Claims on Foreign Countries ; Table IV illustrates
the amounts owed the United States Government. Any prepayment of these
claims will improve the current liquidity position.
improvement of the liquidity position implies two things: First,
increasing our ability to meet a drain on our reserves arising from the
conversions of dollars into gold or foreign currency and second, de-
creasing the possibility that such a drain will occur.






PRESIDENTIAL ACTION TO REDUCE THE DEFICIT
In January, 1965, with preliminary figures indicating a third suc-
cessive year of balance of payments deficits of $3 billion or more,
President Lyndon B. Johnson proposed a two part program to reduce the
deficit and strengthen the world position of the dollar. The first
part of this program was directed at immediately improving the United
States' liquidity position. On 28 January, 1965, in his Economic Mes-
sage to the Congress, President Johnson recommended the removal of re-
quirement for the Federal Reserve Bank to maintain a gold reserve of
not less than 25 per cent against its deposits. The approval of this
recommendation by the Congress on 10 February, 1965, served to make
available $5 billion of gold for meeting international commitments. It
also served to reassure the world that the United States still stood
ready to honor her agreement to redeem dollars for gold at $35 an ounce.
The second part of the President's program also occurred on 10 February,
1965. On that date, the President addressed a message to Congress "...
relative to Review of International Balance of Payments and Our Gold
2
Position." This message first stated that the position of the United
States' dollar was strong, and further stated that the convertibility
of the dollar would continue. Finally, the message set forth the
U. S. Senate, Committee on Banking and Currency, Gold Reserve Re -
quirements , Report No. 65, 89th Cong., 1st Session, 1965, p. 1.
U. S. Congress House of Representatives, Review of International
Balance of Payments and Our Gold Position , Document No. 83, 89th Cong.,
1st Session, 1965, p. 1.
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following ten steps for overcoming the deficit in U. S. Balance of Pay-
ments:
1. Extend the interest equalization tax two additional years
beyond December 31, 1965 and broaden its coverage to non-bank credit of
1 to 3 year maturity.
2. Application by the President of the interest equalization tax
to bank loans of one year or more.
3. Receipt of assurances from the Canadian Government that their
policies would be directed toward limiting capital outflows to those
required for the maintenance of a stable level of Canada's foreign ex-
change reserves.
4. To further limit the flow of bank loans abroad, enrollment of
the banking community in a major effort to limit their lending abroad,
this enrollment to be accomplished by the Chairman of the Board of Gov-
ernors of the Federal Reserve System and the Secretary of the Treasury.
5. Legislation to exempt from antitrust laws bankers who are co-
operating pursuant to the foregoing, where such cooperation is vital to
the national interest.
6. In an effort to reduce the outflow of business capital, direc-
tion to the Secretary of Commerce and the Secretary of the Treasury to
enlist the leaders of American business in a national campaign to limit
their direct investments abroad, their deposits in foreign banks and
their holding of foreign assets until the country's international
accounts balanced.
7. To minimize foreign exchange costs of defense and aid programs,
direction to the Secretary of Defense, the Administrator of AID and
others to cut overseas dollar costs to the bone.
22

8. To limit outflow of tourist dollars, legislation to limit the
duty free exemptions of American tourists returning to the United States.
9. To earn more trade dollars, redoubling of efforts to promote
exports.
10. To attract more investment dollars from abroad, new tax legis-
lation to provide incentives for foreigners to invest in the United
3
States.
In choosing from the measures available to him (Chapter IV), it
is noteworthy that the President chose such measures as would cause no
immediate international economic effects. In addition, no attempt was
made to enlist the support of foreign governments. At a time of dollar
crisis, the President chose to gamble that a substantial reduction of
the deficit could be accomplished by these limited unilateral measures.
The tenor of the message left no doubt that, in presidential opinion,
the lion's share of the responsibility for the large 1964 deficit rested
on the shoulders of the bankers and businessmen. In view of this, it
is remarkable that at a time when a firm brake on capital outflow would
seem to be the only course, the President eschewed coercion and appealed
to businessmen and bankers to support the program on a voluntary basis.
That is not to say that the positive threat of restrictive measures did
not loom behind the President's request.
In recognition of this threat of legislative restrictions, the re-
action of bankers and businessmen was virtually immediate. By the end
of the first quarter of 1965, the outflow of dollars was reported to
have been reduced to a trickle, from a $6 billion annual rate to $2
3
U. S. Cong., H. R. , Doc. No. 83, op_. cit. , pp. 2-3.
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4billion at an annual rate. At the same time, the return flow of dollars
was termed massive. The reversal of the fortunes of the dollar was
even more apparent in the reaction of European economic circles. From
discussion of a dollar glut prior to February 10, by mid-April the talk
was of dollar shortage. The 90 day interest rate on the Euro-dollar
(dollars on deposit in banks overseas which are lent and held abroad)
rose from 4.5% in February to 4.757. in April.
Although possibly premature at such an early date, we may state
that the United States has demonstrated to the world that it is capable
of adjusting its balance of payments, at least in the short run. If
the trend of March and April, 1965, continues, a deficit for 1965 of
only $1 billion is possible. Such an event will no doubt strengthen
the position of the dollar. Foreign dollar balance holders should be
encouraged to continue holding dollars. But, for all these apparent
benefits, is the United States in any way guaranteed that she will not
face another balance of payments problem in six months or even a year?
Within the current international monetary system, so long as the
United States continues the role of reserve currency nation and so long
as foreign dollar liabilities exceed U. S. gold reserves, the United
States will face the risk of recurring balance of payments problems.
Associated Press dispatch, The Monterey (California) Herald ,
April 7, 1965.
"Business Around the World," U. S. News and World Report , Vol.
LVIII No. 14 (April 5, 1965), p. 105.
"Tomorrow," U. S . News and World Report , Vol. LVIII No. 15 (April
12, 1965), p. 25.
Walter Lippmann, "President's Dollar Defense Shows Strength of




The danger of the obvious solution, to become a surplus country and
drain dollars and, hence, the liquidity from international commerce has
already been discussed. Clearly the real solution, the long range solu-
tion, to this problem does not lie within the restrictive boundaries
of the existing international monetary system. We must seek a new sys-
tem which, in the words of Arthur K. Watson, Chairman of IBM World
Trade Organization, "...will give the free world elbow room to grow
o
without these unending balance of payments crises."
The following chapter will examine one such system.
8





A LONG RANGE SOLUTION
A. Introduction
During the first week of February, 1965, General Charles De Gaulle
upset the financial world with a call for a return to the gold stand-
ard. Coming as it did on the heels of the Treasury announcement that
the U. S. 1964 payments deficit was approximately $3 billion, this
proposal certainly did nothing to enhance the United States' position.
However, rather than condemn the General for his betrayal of his 1963
pledge to support the present international monetary system, perhaps
he should be applauded for awakening the world to the need for revision
or replacement of that system.
In June, 1959, Yale economist Robert Triffin unveiled a plan to
overcome what at that time he envisioned as the failings and dangers
of the current International Monetary System. Professor Triffin pub-
lished his proposal in book form in 1960 under the title "Gold and the
1
Dollar Crisis." In testimony before the Joint Senate-House of Repre-
sentatives Economic Committee in October 1959, Professor Triffin
offered his proposal and at the conclusion of the committee hearings
his "most constructive suggestion" was included in the committee re-
port and, in addition, was forwarded to the President, Secretary of
the Treasury, Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
2
and the Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund. How-
ever, 1959 was a year when we had experienced only one balance of







payments yearly deficit. The annoyance of continuous deficits was only
beginning. In addition, the country was approaching a presidential elec-
tion. Attention was focused on the possible candidates of the Democratic
party. Western Europe was embarked on the road to prosperity and was
hardly inclined to consider anything which might disturb the status quo.
So the nation and the world cannot honestly be blamed for ignoring the
Cassandra- like voice of Professor Triffin.
Today, however, after six years of United States payments deficits
and various attempts at their elimination, the attention of the world
is being directed toward the discovery of some new system to do away
with this perennial problem. The solution proposed by Professor Triffin
in 1959 is receiving renewed attention. Among its proponents are Eng-
land's Prime Minister Wilson, Greece's Central Bank Chief Xenophon
3
Zolotas and Bank of Italy Governor Guido Carli. The purpose of the
remainder of this paper will be to examine Professor Triffin 's proposal,
4
its advantages and disadvantages.
B. The Keynes Plan
As Professor Triffin freely admitted, his proposal found its con-
ception in the Keynes Plan for an International Clearing Union as origi-
nally proposed in April of 1943 and later incorporated into the proceed-
ings of the United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference at Bretton
Woods in 1944. In fact, the Triffin proposal accepts the basic frame-
work of the Keynes Plan, but imposes stronger limitations upon it, in
3
"A Cry for Change," Time Magazine , Vol. 85 (April 16, 1965),
p. 90.
Except as otherwise noted, the remainder of this paper will uti-
lize "Gold and the Dollar Crisis" as its source.
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an effort to overcome the outstanding objections to the plan. Let us
first, then, examine the important features of the Keynes Plan.
As previously discussed, the major danger in the international
monetary system today centers around the use of national currencies as
international reserves. The keystone of the Keynes Plan was the re-
placement of these reserves of national currencies with an international
currency. Under the Keynes' International Credit Union all members
would be committed to accept in lieu of gold and without limit trans-
fers of this international currency called bancor to their credit in
the books of the Union in full settlement of any balances due them from
any other members. No member state would be entitled to demand gold
from the Clearing Union against its balance of bancor. This then en-
dowed the Credit Union with unlimited lending capacity since
If no credits be removed outside the clearing system, but only
transferred within it, the Union can never be in difficulty as
regards honoring checks drawn upon it. It can make what advances
it wishes to any of its members with the assurance that the pro-
ceeds can only be transferred to the clearing account of another
member. Its sole task is to see to it that its members keep the
rules and that the advances made to each of them are prudent
and advisable for the Union as a whole.
In the foregoing can be recognized the essential principle underly-
ing the development of national banking systems.
This acceptance of an unlimited credit account would not be burden-
some to the creditor country, for it would have the same effect as the
importation of gold in that it would also indicate possession of a pur-
chasing power, while at the same time signifying voluntary abstention
^Proceedings and Document s of the United Nations Monetary and Fin -




from the use of this power. Unlike the importation of gold, however,
this growing credit account would not withdraw the purchasing power
from circulation or exercise a deflationary or contractionist pressure
on the world. This substitution of a credit mechanism for gold hoarding
makes the analogy to a national banking system complete.
No nation would be obliged to commit themselves directly to the
support of any particular nation or policy or project. The only re-
quirement placed upon the member states is to permit the pooling of
their surplus resources with those of other members to be employed on
approved projects. At the same time, any member having need of its
surplus resources would be free to withdraw them from the pool.
What Keynes proposed then was an international bank whose deposi-
tors would be nations and which would be able to function in the same
manner as the national banks. From a narrowly economic point of view
there can be no objection to the plan. However, the main objection to
the plan is not economic, but rather, political. This political objec-
tion is twofold. First there is the risk that unwise use of the Clear-
ing Union's lending facilities to finance inflationary rather than ex-
pansionist policies throughout the world, would reduce the value of the
creditor accounts. However, if the creditor countries were in agree-
ment with the Union's lending policies, there could hardly be justifica-
tion for complaint against decisions in which they concurred. The core
of the problem lies in the voting procedures of the Union and the loss
of sovereignty which might be involved. The safeguards to allay these
fears, provided in the Keynes Plan were, however, "totally inadequate








The second objection lies in the anonymity of the Union's lending.
This anonymity, while one of the virtues of the plan, at the same time
results in the loss of political influence and bargaining power acquired
by the lending nations in direct negotiations with the borrowers.
The political nature of these objections must be appreciated if a
workable solution is to be obtained in this nationalistic world. Dis-
tinction must be made between what might be accomplished by world-wide
agreement and what may prove achievable only on a regional scale within
smaller and more homogeneous groups of interdependent countries.
C. The International Monetary Fund
The key point of the Triffin plan would be the substitution of
International Monetary Fund balances for balances in national currencies,
i.e., dollars and pounds sterling in all member countries' monetary re-
serves. Therefore, it would be well to review at this point the purposes
and functions of the IMF.
The purposes of the IMF include:
a) International monetary cooperation
b) Expansion and balanced growth of international trade
c) Maintenance of exchange stability and orderly exchange
arrangements among members
d) The establishment of a multilateral system of payments
for current transactions and the elimination of exchange
restrictions.
Each member is expected to declare a par value for its currency ex-
pressed in terms of gold or U. S. dollars and to maintain the buying and
selling rate of its currency within one per cent of the par value. Each
member has a quota, which determines the amount of its subscription,
measures the extent to which the member may have access to the Fund's
resources and governs the member's voting power. This quota is usually
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composed of 25 per cent gold and 75 per cent the member government's
currency.
The Fund sells to a member needed currencies In return for that
member's currencies. The amount of such sales, called drawings, is
limited to the "gold tranche," the amount of the member's subscription
in gold. Drawings with the "tranche" are permitted only if and to the
extent that the quantity of that member's currency has fallen below the
75 per cent of the original subscription. Drawings which would bring
the Fund's holdings of a member's currency above 100 per cent, but less
than 125 per cent of its subscription, are given liberal treatment. How-
ever, drawings in excess of this limit must be accompanied by proof of
a member's efforts to solve its problems.
The Fund, in appropriate instances, will provide compensatory fin-
ancing of export fluctuations. Drawings made under these arrangements
are expected to be repurchased by the member with gold or currencies
7
needed by the Fund over a period of not more than 3 to 5 years.
It is easily seen that the IMF contribution to world liquidity is
relatively static, determined as it is by members' quotas. With the
rapid growth of trade and the necessity for concurrent growth in mone-
tary liquidity, the only method by which the Fund can keep pace is by
an increase in members' quotas. On 17 March, 1965, President Johnson
requested approval of Congress for an increase in the United States' IMF
8
quota by the amount of $1,035 billion. The last general quota increase
U. S. Congress, House of Representatives, Ninth Special Report of
the National Advisory Council on International Monetary and Financial
Problems
,
Document No. 60, 89th Congress, 1st Session, 1965, pp. 4-5.
^U. S. Congress, House of Representatives, A Bill to Amend the Bret '
ton Woods Agreements Act to Authorize an Increase in the International





took place in 1959. The current proposed general quota Increase will
provide the fund with an additional $5 billion, if subscribed to by all
members. It is clear that this will just provide operating cash for a
while, until the next quota increase is demanded.
D. The Triffin Plan
The Triffin Plan is intended to preserve the core of the Keynes
Plan mechanism, while countering the objections raised against it. It
would retain IMF accounts as a fully multilateral means of settlement,
thus simplifying the lending and borrowing operations of the institution
and guaranteeing the interconvertibility of all member currencies.
The lending capacity of the IMF would be based upon the accumula-
tion of credit accounts by member nations, as an integral part of their
monetary reserves along with, and fully equivalent to, gold for inter-
national transactions. This does not require that the Fund be endowed
with unlimited, and hence possibly inflationary, lending capacity, nor
require that members commit themselves to accepting unlimited credit
accounts.
The lending capacity can be limited to the creation of credit
accounts sufficient to guarantee an adequate level of world liquidity.
The simplest method for accomplishing this end would be to limit net
lending for any twelve-month period to an amount which, together with
gold production, would increase world reserves by possibly 3 to 5 per
cent. The exact figure would be calculated and negotiated.
To finance the lending, an accumulation of Fund balances by the
members would be required as a part of the annual increase in their
total reserves. Most nations now hold foreign currencies as a part of
their monetary reserves. This is done first for the convenience and
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lower cost incidental to the use of key currencies rather than gold in
international transactions, and second the earnings derived from main-
taining a portion of the reserves in the form of foreign exchange.
Inherent in this practice is the risk of exchange fluctuation, incon-
vertibility, blocking, or even default. The shift from national cur-
rency balances to Fund balances would preserve the advantages and dimin-
ish the disadvantages of this practice. Fund earnings would be distri-
buted among members pro rata of their balances. Expressed as they would
be in gold units, the danger of inconvertibility would not exist. Bal-
ances could at any time be used as freely as gold to make payments to
any other member and even non-members.
The advantages of the system should ultimately create a demand for
Fund balances, especially on the part of those nations now holding a
large portion of their national reserves in foreign currencies. This is
not likely though in the early years of operation. In order to finance
the lending operation and at the same time maintain full convertibility,
the simplest solution is to require members to maintain a certain per-
centage of their gross monetary reserves in the form of Fund deposits.
All members would accept such deposits in settlement of their interna-
tional claims without limit, but would have the right to convert at any
time into gold all deposits accrued to their account in excess of the
minimum requirement*
This requirement would replace the present Fund quota system and
offer additional advantages to the members. First, the balances so held
would be completely liquid and usable in payments and, therefore, could
honestly be considered as a part of the members' reserves. Second, the
deposit obligations would adjust automatically to expansions or
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contractions of the reserve position of each country. Most important,
perhaps, is the fact that this increase in minimum Fund deposits require-
ments would concentrate on countries holding net surpluses and whose
currency is most in demand.
Three types of assets would be acceptable to meet the minimum de-
posit requirements:
1. Net creditor claims previously accumulated on the Fund
2. Other liquid or semi-liquid foreign exchange holdings, i.e.,
primarily dollar and sterling balances
3. Gold
If gold continues to hold its attraction, it is safe to assume that
most nations will prefer to transfer to the Fund a portion of their
foreign exchange holdings. If a 20 per cent of reserves figure is as-
sumed, only a handful of countries would be obliged to deposit gold to
meet their obligation. At this rate, the Fund would hold approximately
half its assets in gold and the remainder in foreign exchange, primarily
dollars and pounds. These dollars and pounds represent claims for gold,
hence the United States and Great Britain would be considered to be in
debt to the Fund for this amount and would be expected to amortize the
debt at an agreed annual rate.
In operation, the Fund would credit currency sales to the deposit
account of the nation whose currency had been sold. The large gold hold-
ings of the Fund would guarantee the convertibility into gold of any
excess of deposits above the required minimum deposit. If as can be ex-
pected, the dollar continues to be the most demanded currency and the
United States begins to accumulate excess deposits and desires conver-
sion to gold of these excesses the Fund could require extraordinary
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amortization of the debt. This would also serve as a safeguard against
a scarcity of dollars or pounds in view of the large initial holdings
of these currencies.
Having assumed a minimum reserve requirement for the operations of
the Fund, the logical progression would be the conversion of all foreign
exchange reserves, less immediate operating requirements, to Fund bal-
ances. This would cause no change in the Fund gold assets and increase
its foreign exchange holdings threefold. This move would expose the
Fund to the danger of excessive depletion of its gold resources from two
quarters:
1. Direct conversion into gold by members of the excessive deposits
over required minimums thus resulting.
2. Later conversion into gold by the countries whose subsequent
surpluses are settled through transfers of Fund balances from deficit
countries' accounts to the surplus countries' account.
The first danger would easily be offset, as far as sterling balances
are concerned, by establishment of the policy that conversion to gold
would only apply to Fund balances exceeding the sum of the country's nor-
mal per cent requirement plus the balances initially acquired in exchange
for the gold inconvertible national currency balances. This would effec-
tively limit convertibility to dollar balances. However, as those coun-
tries, primarily the United Kingdom, whose gold inconvertible currencies
are held as assets by the Fund, amortize their indebtedness to the Fund,
this limitation would gradually be removed. Direct conversion into gold
of excessive dollar balances could only be met by extraordinary amortiza-
tion of United States indebtedness to the Fund.
The remaining danger is diminished by the fact that only 80 per cent
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of such transfers would expose the Fund to gold payments since 20 per
cent of them would increase the minimum deposit requirements of the re-
ceiving countries. In addition, the option of the Fund to claim addi-
tional amortization from debtors of the balances could bring additional
gold resources to the Fund.
It appears feasible then that the proposed system would permit ab-
sorption and consolidation of all outstanding foreign exchange reserves.
Safeguard of Fund liquidity must be provided against unforeseen conver-
sions of excess deposits into gold and against a widening gap between
world gold stocks and the desirable expansion of overall monetary re-
serves. Three possible methods for protecting the Fund are as follows:
1. Issuance by the Fund of medium term gold certificates payable
either in gold or excess deposits and carrying a higher rate of interest
than liquid Fund deposits.
2. Authorization for the Fund to raise the per cent deposit re-
quirements uniformly.
3. Impose higher deposit requirements on that portion of each
member's reserves which exceeds the average ratio of world monetary gold
to world imports.
One further facet of the plan requires examination before conclud-
ing, the Fund Lending Operations. These loans should be of two broad
categories:
1. Advances or rediscounts undertaken at the initiative of the bor-
rowing country.
2. Open market operations, or investments, undertaken at the ini-
tiative of the Fund.
The first category would not differ appreciably from the loans
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granted by the Fund today. The second category would involve operations
in the financial markets of member countries. These operations would,
of course, always be in agreement with the monetary policies of the
countries involved in order to protect against exchange and inconverti-
bility risks.
A primary consideration for Fund investments is the preservation of
full liquidity of members' deposits. Since the Fund required deposits
can be expected to grow yearly as world reserves increase, the liquidity
problem is confined to preservation of convertibility of excess deposits
into any currency or gold as desired. This has been amply discussed in
the preceding pages.
While it is clear that Professor Triffin's proposal for a new Inter-
national Monetary System within the existing IMF framework is feasible,
it is at the same time, at the very least, visionary. It is a goal
toward which to aim. It is doubtful that in this era of ultra-national-
ism that any nation will willingly sacrifice any of its sovereignty to
such an ultra- international concept. But, as the child must walk before
it runs, so also must the world learn.
Most probably, the ultimate acceptance of such a plan will depend
in great part upon the success of the smaller modern-day organizations
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